The war in Yemen, which had remained “frozen” for four years, has erupted once again, with its flames reaching the heart of Saudi Arabia. On Saturday, October 10, missiles struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. Saudi authorities reported that at least 12 people were killed and more than 300 injured. The attack was described as the deadliest against the Kingdom in more than a decade. Ansarullah, better known as the Houthis, claimed responsibility. Riyadh vowed to retaliate, while airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition against Ansarullah-controlled areas continued.

The UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, told the Security Council on October 9 that Yemen had once again entered a “full-scale war.” He warned that battlefield superiority could not replace negotiations, which would ultimately remain necessary.

For readers in Indonesia, this news might easily be dismissed as a distant issue in the Arabian Peninsula. That would be a mistake. On August 11, three Indonesian crew members became victims of an attack on the cargo ship Tihamah in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. One was reported missing, while two others were injured.

The conflict affects maritime routes, energy prices, Hajj and Umrah travel, and Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy. This article examines the roots of the conflict, its consequences, the lessons Indonesia can draw from it, and the role the country can play.

The Roots and Dynamics of the Conflict

The roots of the conflict in Yemen are complex and multifaceted. Ansarullah took control of Sanaa in 2014 following its conflict with the Yemeni government. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition, supported by Gulf states, launched military operations against Ansarullah. Since then, Yemen has become an arena for regional power competition.

The UN-facilitated ceasefire in 2022 eased the fighting but did not produce a political settlement. Negotiations on a Riyadh–Sanaa peace roadmap, mediated by Oman, proceeded without the participation of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The process subsequently stalled over disputes concerning salary payments, port management, and economic arrangements. Regional crises, ranging from the war in Gaza to the United States and Israeli attacks on Iran in February 2026, have further narrowed the space for compromise.

Divisions within the anti-Ansarullah camp have also widened. In January 2026, Saudi Arabia attacked forces belonging to the Southern Transitional Council, which has long been supported by the United Arab Emirates. The incident exposed growing tensions between the two Gulf powers within the coalition. Southern groups have also viewed the bilateral roadmap with suspicion, believing that it overlooks their interests.

For Riyadh, the roadmap initially offered a way out of a costly military engagement while seeking to end cross-border attacks and support its economic transformation agenda. For Ansarullah, meanwhile, the roadmap represented a pathway toward the payment of public-sector salaries, the reopening of ports and airports, and political recognition. However, reports that Washington was pressuring the parties to freeze the agreement further pushed the peace process into a deadlock.

On July 13, 2026, an Ansarullah delegation returning from Tehran after attending the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who was reported to have died on February 28, 2026, was attacked by Saudi Arabia as it was preparing to land at Sanaa Airport. Ansarullah rejected the attack, subsequently struck Abha Airport, and announced a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia.

In September, Ansarullah took control of Mokha and areas surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Riyadh-backed Yemeni government responded with an offensive called “Dawn of Yemen,” launched on October 4. On October 5, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia agreed to activate deterrence measures under a mutual defense pact. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump did not rule out the possibility of United States involvement in the attacks.

Each side has its own narrative. Riyadh maintains that it is defending the legitimate government and protecting freedom of navigation. Ansarullah, by contrast, describes the embargo as retaliation for the Saudi blockade and attacks, while insisting that its targets are limited to Saudi interests.

We do not need to choose between these narratives to recognize one reality: civilians are paying a heavy price for both sides’ claims.

The Impact: From Yemeni Households to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait

Civilians are bearing the greatest burden of this conflict. The United Nations reported that 22.3 million people in Yemen required assistance in 2026, including 5.2 million internally displaced people. Some 18.3 million people faced acute food insecurity, more than 2.2 million children under five suffered from acute malnutrition, and nearly 40 percent of health facilities were not fully operational.

Since August, at least 46 civilians have reportedly been killed and more than 130 injured. The latest escalation has occurred just as resources for humanitarian assistance have continued to shrink.

The suffering has also spread beyond Yemen’s borders. On October 8, a boat carrying more than 300 migrants from Djibouti to Yemen capsized. At least 139 people were reported dead, while another 84 remained missing.

The economic consequences are equally tangible. An attack on Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline network on September 10 halted crude oil exports from the port of Yanbu. Since Ansarullah’s embargo took effect, almost no vessels affiliated with Saudi Arabia have crossed the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a route through which nearly 15 percent of global maritime trade passes.

Traffic through the Suez Canal has begun to recover, but in August it remained 39 percent below its pre-crisis level. That recovery remains vulnerable to further escalation.

The conflict has also disrupted human mobility. Riyadh Airport was temporarily paralyzed, several airlines suspended flights to Saudi Arabia, and schools in the capital shifted to remote learning. For millions of people who depend on these airports, including Indonesian Hajj and Umrah pilgrims and migrant workers, such disruptions are far from abstract.

Regional risks are also growing. The activation of the Türkiye–Pakistan–Saudi defense pact and the possibility of United States involvement demonstrate how quickly a civil war can develop into a confrontation involving multiple countries.

Three Lessons for Indonesia

First, a ceasefire is not the same as peace. An agreement that silences the guns without creating political space for all parties merely closes a wound that has yet to heal. A bilateral roadmap that sidelines Yemen’s government and southern groups illustrates the dangers of an exclusionary approach.

Indonesia has learned a similar lesson from the 2005 Helsinki Agreement on Aceh. The peace process endured because it adopted an inclusive approach, addressed economic interests, and was monitored by a third party.

Second, a maritime nation must never assume that sea lanes and energy supplies will always remain secure. When a strait is blocked, logistics costs, insurance premiums, and energy prices can rise around the world, including at Indonesian ports.

Energy resilience, diversification of trade routes, and the capacity to protect national waters are strategic investments, not luxuries. This lesson is particularly relevant to Indonesia, which has the Strait of Malacca and the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ALKI), both of which are important to global trade. The three Indonesian seafarers who became victims of the attack in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are a painful reminder of these risks.

Third, we must assess the conflict with clarity. This war is driven by security interests and competition over strategic routes, not merely by sectarian differences. Uncritically importing a Sunni–Shia framework into the conflict will only intensify polarization at home.

Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy requires the country not to align itself with any bloc. However, this does not mean remaining neutral when it comes to international humanitarian law. Attacks on civilian airports and the besieging of cities must be rejected, regardless of who carries them out.

Such clarity is also essential to protecting Indonesian society. A public that understands the roots of the conflict in their entirety is less likely to be manipulated by hate-driven narratives and more likely to channel its solidarity into tangible humanitarian assistance rather than mere arguments on social media.

The Role Indonesia Can Play

What, then, can Indonesia do?

Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for dialogue and an inclusive political process led by the Yemeni people. On October 12, the ministry also strongly condemned attacks against civilians and civilian objects.

Former Vice President KH Ma’ruf Amin, on July 29, proposed a “four-pillar dialogue bridge”: a humanitarian pause, mediation by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) together with religious scholars from around the world, inclusive reconciliation, and a conflict-free zone in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These positions and proposals deserve appreciation, but they must be followed by concrete action.

Some observers may ask: how much leverage does Indonesia have amid competition among major powers and military pacts?

Indonesia’s leverage lies not in its weapons but in the trust it can command. Indonesia maintains good relations with both Riyadh and Tehran and, in early 2026, offered to facilitate dialogue as tensions in the Middle East intensified.

The primary mediation efforts remain in the hands of the United Nations and Oman. Indonesia does not need to compete for the spotlight. Its task is to support a peace process in which all parties have confidence.

There are three reasons why Indonesia is well placed to act.

First, there is its constitutional mandate. The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution calls on Indonesia to contribute to establishing world order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice.

Second, there are Indonesia’s direct interests. Its citizens, seafarers, pilgrims, and trade routes are all exposed to the consequences of this war.

Third, Indonesia has a track record. From supporting the resolution of the conflict in Aceh to deploying Garuda peacekeeping contingents in various missions, Indonesia has experience in acting as a mediator rather than taking sides.

Indonesia can pursue four concrete measures.

First, promote an urgent, limited agreement. Through the OIC and bilateral diplomatic channels, Indonesia can encourage a moratorium on attacks against airports, energy facilities, ports, and civilian residential areas. Such an agreement would not require the parties to resolve every political dispute; it would simply establish a minimum standard of humanitarian protection.

Second, share the lessons of the Aceh peace process. Indonesia can offer its experience as a source of learning, rather than as a blueprint that must be replicated in full. Key principles include a trusted mediator, inclusive negotiations, economic guarantees for all parties, and independent monitoring.

Third, mobilize civil society and religious diplomacy. Indonesia can involve Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and humanitarian organizations as bridges for dialogue and channels for aid, while ensuring that their involvement is not perceived as taking sides.

Fourth, express its readiness to contribute to a UN ceasefire-monitoring mission once the parties have reached an agreement. This would be consistent with Indonesia’s longstanding experience in peacekeeping operations in conflict zones around the world.

These measures carry risks. An offer to mediate could be rejected or perceived as biased if Indonesia condemns only one side. Consistency is therefore essential. Indonesia must condemn every attack against civilians, whether it involves missiles launched by Ansarullah or airstrikes conducted by the coalition.

Indonesia should also coordinate with those already playing key roles in the peace process, including the United Nations, Oman, and Gulf states, so that its efforts complement rather than compete with existing initiatives.

At the same time, protecting Indonesian citizens must remain a priority, from seafarers and students in Yemen to workers and pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. The Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh has assisted three citizens affected by flight disruptions and urged Indonesians to exercise greater caution.

A Table Wide Enough for Everyone

The long history of the war in Yemen shows that victory on the battlefield is never enough. Offensives come and go, cities change hands, yet children remain hungry and airports continue to be targeted.

Indonesia, having witnessed the resolution of armed conflict in Aceh through negotiations, has both the moral grounds and the practical experience to convey a message to all parties: it is time to talk.

Peace in Yemen will not emerge simply from determining who controls Mokha or Taiz. It will come from a negotiating table wide enough to accommodate all parties. Preparing a seat at that table is a task worthy of Indonesia’s commitment.

Author: Prof. Dr. Kholid Al Walid, M.Ag. (Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Lecturer at the Faculty of Ushuluddin)

Image Credit: Documentation, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta

This article was originally published by Akurat.co on October 14, 2026, under the title “When the Flames of Yemen Reach Riyadh: Lessons and Indonesia’s Role.” https://akurat.co/opini/898623/ketika-api-yaman-menjalar-ke-riyadh-pelajaran-dan-peran-bagi-indonesia?page=all